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PILOTED EVALUATION OF FLIGHT DIRECTOR GO-AROUND MODES
AND WINDSHEAR ICON CONCEPTS
by
W.F.J.A. Rouwhorst (NLR), H. Haverdings (NLR),
H.T. Huynh (ONERA), F. Descatoire (ONERA),
K-U. Hahn (DLR), R. König (DLR)
Abstract
This paper presents some specific results of a piloted
windshear investigation performed by the members
of the GARTEUR Flight Mechanics Action Group
FM-AG(07) at the end of 1994.
The main objectives were to investigate the effect of
forward-looking windshear detection systems on
flight operation, flight safety and Human-Machine
Interface (HMI) aspects. As a by-product the Flight
Director (FD) performance for assistance during go-
around and windshear recoveries was evaluated. Two
different types of FD go-around modes were
compared with each other. Also having no FD-
assistance at all was compared with having a fixed
pitch FD-mode. Some main results will be presented.
Furthermore, two similar, but different forms of
windshear icon presentations on the EFIS/NAV-
display were evaluated. These icons were derived by
means of a scanning laser in real time. A few main
results will be given. Unexpectedly, some crashes
occurred during the experiment. To learn of these,
two of them will be analyzed. Some of the
conclusions drawn were that, in case of a windshear
recovery, having a fixed pitch FD mode assistance
during the windshear recovery was found slightly
better than having no FD assistance. Furthermore the
windshear icon displays improved situational
awareness and reduced flight safety risk significantly.
Background
Following ongoing developments in the area of
windshear detection system technology being
performed by a NASA/FAA/Industry Team1, the
international collaboration organization GARTEUR
(=Group for Aeronautical Research and Technology
in EURope) installed Flight Mechanics Action Group
FM-AG(05) in 1991. In this group participated the
research institutes ONERA (of France), DLR (of
Germany) and NLR (of The Netherlands). A work
program was defined that consisted of three
objectives:
- To acquire more knowledge about the relevant
atmospheric perturbations, their probability of
occurrence and about modeling these effects.
- To have a better understanding of the behavior of
transport aircraft in windshear conditions.
- To evaluate the benefits of forward-looking
windshear detection sensors using offline and
piloted simulations.
These first two objectives were met by Action Group
FM-AG(05)2,3.Numerical simulations were performed
to investigate the effect of forward-looking wind-
shear detection systems on flight safety.4,5,6
At the end of 1993 a follow-on Action Group was
installed. This Action Group FM-AG(07) consisted
of the same members as the preceding one and would
prepare and execute a piloted windshear flight
simulator investigation.
To avoid duplication of work, the GARTEUR Action
Group activities where harmonized in early 1994 with
an ongoing national research program (named
WINDSTREAM) carried out by NLR. This program
was supported (co-funded) by the NIVR (the
Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programmes) and
the RLD (the Netherlands Department of Civil
Aviation). As part of the WINDSTREAM project a
preparatory piloted experiment was held at the end of
19937 and a follow-on experiment was already in the
phase of preparation. The harmonization resulted in
the execution of a combined piloted windshear
experiment in November/December of 1994.
Introduction
The main aim of the 1994 piloted GARTEUR
windshear experiment was to investigate the effect of
forward-looking windshear detection systems on flight
operation, flight safety and HMI aspects.
This paper reports parts of this work and has been
organized such that the experiment setup will be
addressed briefly first. More details can be found in
the Testplan8, and also in a paper in the public
domain9. Although in fact not a main aim but a by-
product of the overall study, flight director aspects
will be addressed. Specifically, as generally little has
been reported on this, two different flight director
pitch steering modes used for the go-around phase of
flight will be commented on. Furthermore, some final
results related to the windshear icon concepts
evaluated will be presented. Full results can be found
in the final report of FM-AG(07)9. Two unexpected
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fatal experimental runs (crashes) will be reported and
analyzed. Finally, the conclusions, a future outlook
and the references are given.
Brief description of the 1994 experiment
Crews
Six international flight crews of the GARTEUR
nations involved participated in the experiment and
flew 54 approaches each, of which 12 were training
runs. So 252 measurement runs were obtained in  total.
Averaged over both crews members, their flight
experience varied from “very much” (over 15000  hrs)
to “little“ (about 2100 hrs).Crews were instructed    to
apply the Manual Crew Coordination Procedure
(MCCP) as listed in the Pilot Briefing guide sent out
to them before the experiment.
Sub-experiments
First sub-experiment
The total experiment was split up in two sub-parts. In
the first sub-part a reactive and a forward-looking
windshear detection system were tested separately.
Also the effect of adding a flight-director guidance
during a go-around or windshear escape was
evaluated:
- two different types of FD-assistance were
compared with each other when flying with the
onboard laser windshear detection system only.
- when flying with the reactive system, having no
FD-assistance was compared with having one.
However, in this sub-experiment no special wind-
shear icon information was presented on the
EFIS/NAV-display, only EFIS/PFD windshear labels
and accompanying aural alerts were presented to the
crews.
A non-scanning laser was evaluated at two different
fixed look ranges of 1600 and 2400m, based on the
FM-AG(05) numerical simulations4,5 and in order to
be able to compare them with the piloted simulations.
These distances equate to a warning lead time of 20-
30 seconds based on an approach speed of 80 m/s.
Second sub-experiment
In the second part of the experiment the effect of two
different types of presenting windshear icons on the
EFIS/NAV-display was evaluated. All runs were
flown with one (viz. the modified) type of FD-
guidance during the go-around.
To be able to derive the windshear icons, a scanning
laser model was used and operated in real time. The
laser beam tilt was automatically aligned with the
inertial flight path vector and could not be controlled
by the pilot. The laser scanned in a plane at this
elevation within±45 degrees either side of the vector,
assuming a wings-level stabilization. The laser look
range varied from a minimum of 300 m to a
maximum of about 8 km. The maximum range could
degrade when precipitation (rain) was included in the
windshear cells presented.
Flight and evaluation task
The crews were asked to execute the approach and
land the aircraft safely on runway 06 of Amsterdam
Airport, or to perform a go-around and stabilize the
aircraft at 2500 ft above ground level (AGL). Crews
performed manual approaches assisted by the FD,
and with the Autothrottle (AT) engaged.
After every run both pilots had to fill out a question-
naire, for instance to evaluate their satisfaction with
the flight director performance during the go-around.
They also had to rate the usefulness of the windshear
icons presented to them, if any, and to individually
rate the effort and mental workload required for the
conduct of the whole flight.
Research Flight Simulator
The GARTEUR experiment was conducted on
NLR’s moving base Research Flight Simulator
(RFS). The RFS consists of a side-by-side transport
cockpit mounted on top of a four-degrees–of-
freedom (4DOF) motion base. Outside view was
generated via a TV modelboard and a Singer-Link
Miles MkV system. The cockpit has been equipped
with six CRTs and three fully programmable CDUs.
Noteworthy is to mention that this RFS facility will
be upgraded in the coming three years. A computer-
generated vision, an advanced civil transport cockpit
and a 6DOF motion base will be installed.
Some models used
Aircraft model
In the experiment use was made of a fully nonlinear
model with the characteristics of the Boeing 747-200.
Aircraft parameters were based on the Maximum
Landing Weight of 285,500 kg. Reference speed in
the standard final approach configuration (flaps 30,
gear down) was 151 kts. Maximum (Gross) Thrust
over Weight was about 0.27.
Windshear models
Earth-fixed (“time frozen”) microburst models of the
ring vortex type were used11. Multiple cells with
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multiple vortices each could occur. Furthermore the
Earth’s boundary layer effect was included. The wind
components were calculated at each aircraft position
and used in the aircraft equations of motion and by
the reactive windshear detection sensor. In case the
onboard forward-looking laser windshear sensor was
operated, use was made of a pre-stored three-
dimensional windgrid.
Turbulence model
The standard turbulence model available at NLR’s
RFS facility was applied12. It generates non-Gaussian
turbulence and features intermittency, patchiness and
influences of altitude and windspeed on turbulence
scale lengths and intensities. In case of windshear, a
special anisotropic effect was included by adding a
fraction of the calculated wind from one axis into the
turbulence intensity of another axis.
Windshear alerting
Both visual and aural windshear alerts were presented
in the cockpit.
Visual alerts were presented on the EFIS/PFD and
related to a sensor-based concept, i.e. showing alert
labels every time a sensor detected a windshear. The
top label belonged to the reactive sensor alert and the
bottom label to the forward-look sensor alert. Both
labels could appear at the same moment, see Fig.1.
Blue, amber and red labels could appear, correspond-
ing to increasing hazard levels.
For the aural alerts a special threat-level based
concept was devised. To minimize the amount of
voice alerts, only alerts of a higher hazard level than
the one given before, would be passed on to the crew.
Then the computer voice would speak out the label
text of the highest windshear threat twice.
In the second sub-part of the experiment, windshear
areas where also visualized on the EFIS/NAV-display
by showing icons, based on information derived from
the scanning-laser.
Furthermore, as an experimental variable, crews were
sometimes allowed to apply a speed increment after a
windshear alert and sometimes they were not.
Go-around flight procedure aspects
During the pilot briefing, the flight crews were
thoroughly briefed about the MCCP and were
instructed to apply normal operation safety standards
related to the initiation and execution of a go-around.
To distinguish a windshear go-around from a normal
go-around, the Pilot Flying (PF) had to call
“Windshear Go-around” instead of “Go-around”.
Windshear flight procedure aspects
It was stated in the experimental flight procedures
that in case of any windshear alert of the WARNING
type, i.e. red labels on the PFD, a go-around had to be
made.
Due to the fact that a forward-looking sensor is able to
give lead time before entering a shear, a normal go-
around instead of a windshear type of go-around was
allowed to be made. However, in case of a reactive
system warning alert a Windshear Training Aid
(WTA)13 type of go-around always had to be made.
This was because flight crews are mostly trained to
act and react according to the standards defined in the
WTA and the Pilot Windshear Guide14, in case of a
windshear occurrence.
Without having advanced flight guidance systems
available during a windshear escape, the flight crew
will fall back from FD-assisted flight during the ILS
tracking, to an unassisted flight while executing the
missed approach. According to the WTA the near-
optimal way of performing such a missed approach is
to apply full (TOGA) thrust and to fly away with a
constant pitch attitude, leaving the aircraft config-
uration (flaps, gear) unchanged until out of the shear,
above 1000 ft AGL and not below the reference
speed. The WTA-recommended pitch angle is 15
degrees, however for this experiment 12 degrees was
chosen as is recommended in the Aircraft Operations
Manual (AOM) of the particular aircraft type used in
the experiment.
Flight Director aspects
Flight director go-around pitch steering modes
During a normal flight director (FD)-assisted ap-
proach the FD pitch bar showed a signal to minimize
deviations from the ILS glide slope. The moment the
crew would select TOGA thrust, either via the Flight
Mode Panel or by pressing the TOGA switches on
the throttle levers, the ILS tracking mode reverted to
the go-around mode under evaluation. The FD roll
channel was coupled to the heading (select/hold)
mode and was not explicitly evaluated.
Flight director go-around aspects investigated
Two FD aspects investigated, related to a missed
approach, were:
- Unassisted versus the FD-assisted go-around
- The standard versus the modified FD mode
In case the FD was not to be used (i.e. the unassisted
go-around) the pitch and roll command bars were
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stowed out of sight whenever the TOGA switch was
pressed. These situations will be referred to as NO-
FD to distinguish them from the FD assisted go-
around.
For the latter, two different types of go-around pitch
steering modes were evaluated:
- The standard mode (STD)
- The modified fixed pitch mode (MOD)
These modes will be described in more detail next.
Standard FD mode
The standard (STD) flight director pitch steering
logic for the go-around represented a conventional
go-around mode without any kind of windshear
guidance or advanced stall protection, see Fig.2. The
logic was such that after mode activation it would
calculate two pitch error signals:
-The first error signal (Delta_1) prevented the actual
climb rate from becoming lower than a minimum
desired (reference) climb rate of 500 feet/min.
-The second error signal (Delta_2) tried to reduce the
error between the momentary calibrated airspeed
(V_c) and the regulated speed (V_reg). The value of
this regulated speed used by the logic, depended on
the AT-selected speed (V_sel) and was limited by the
maximum and minimum speed belonging to the
flap setting chosen by the crew.
Both pitch error signals were compared to one another
and the one with the highest absolute value was
passed on to the pitch steering needle. Note that in this
way the regulation of one parameter (i.e. either speed
or climb speed) implicitly took into account the
regulation of the other parameter.
The logic of the STD-FD mode tried to prevent the
aircraft’s speed from deviating more than 15 kts from
the regulated speed. However, it did not provide
signals to prevent the pilot from stalling the aircraft.
Modified, fixed pitch FD mode
The fixed pitch, or MODified mode, see Fig.3, tried
to overcome this latter problem and when activated,
would indicate a constant pitch attitude (θ_ga) to the
pilot while performing the missed approach.
Furthermore, a protection angle of attack logic was
available. It was always engaged, but not necessarily
active. The value of the go-around pitch angle used
would depend on the flap setting operated. With a
final approach configuration (30 deg. flaps, gear
down), the angle to be flown was 12 degrees, in
accordance with the AOM recommended target pitch
angle for an unassisted recovery. Offline simulations
were performed to derive the associated FD go-
around pitch angles for the other flap settings, see
Table 1 below.
Table 1 FD reference pitch angles in the go-around
Flap setting (deg)
1 5 10 20 25 30
θGA
(deg)
15 17 17.5 17.5 17 12
αPROT
(deg)
8.5 13 12.5 12.5 11.6 11.6
Since a constant pitch angle may lead to aircraft stall
in case of a severe windshear, a protection logic was
devised and incorporated. The protection logic would
only become active if the following two conditions
were met:
1) The go-around mode had been engaged
2) The actual, but filtered angle of attack (αf)
exceeds the predefined protection angle of attack
(αPROT )
When the protection logic intervened a FD pitch down
command would be given equal to the dif-ference
between the actual filtered and the protected angle of
attack. This protected alpha was chosen to be 1 degree
below the stick shaker angle of attack belonging to a
aircraft flap setting, see Table 1.
Pilots were made aware of the pitch margin to stall by
a so-called Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI) on the Primary
Flight Display (PFD) pitch ladder, see Fig.1. If the
actual pitch was below this PLI, the FD needle would
indicate a positive pitch margin with respect to the
stick shaker angle of attack. A stick shaker signal was
given the moment the PLI and the FD pitch bar needle
coincided.
FD mode switching-dynamics
A rate and amplitude limiter and a low-pass filter
prevented a fast FD-bar jump when switching from
the ILS-tracking to the go-around mode.
FD objective data recording
Various parameters, e.g. (FD) pitch angle, (vertical)
speed, angle of attack etc, were recorded from the
moment the go-around was initiated until the moment
of altitude capture. Statistical properties like the
mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation
were calculated immediately after every run. Results
will be given per sensor type, but for the extreme
windshear cases only, because only this way a
reasonable comparison was possible.
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Analysis of FD results
For the statistical analysis a significance level of p 0.1
was used. Because the experimental design was a
fractional factorial one, the data of the first sub-
experiment was not sufficiently well balanced to
make a valid comparison possible. Therefore
sometimes also data from the second sub-experiment
had to be added and/or cases with and without an
allowed speed increment had to be mixed.
Pilot opinions about STD versus MOD-FDmode
The pilot opinions obtained via the run-by-run
questionnaire are presented in Fig.4. It shows that in
the majority of cases the crews were satisfied with the
behavior of each FD type. To find out the reason why
pilots sometimes disliked the FD-behavior, and
indicated “no” or “may be”, Fig.5 shows the answers
given. With the STD mode the commanded pitch was
found to be too low most of the time, while the
opposite was true for the MOD mode. “Other” stands
for a lack of FD-smartness, e.g. not including an
altitude /stall margin dependency in the logic.
When comparing both FD types statistically by
applying the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, no
significant difference was found (p=.3147).
Based on these results both FD modes should be
judged to be equally satisfactory, but oddly enough
afterwards crews stated they were generally
dissatisfied with both of them (see pilot comments).
Comparison of stall margin performance
Fig.6 shows the overall effect of the FD type on the
stall margin during the go-around. Comparison of the
minimum or maximum values were found not to be
significantly different, but the mean values of the
stall margin were. In case of the measurement runs
with the reactive sensor it reduced about 1.5 degrees
when comparing NO-FD with the MOD-FD. This was
due to the fact that without a FD lower pitch angles
were flown than with the MOD-FD mode present.
However, also the use of a possibly applied speed
increment may have played a role, since sometimes
crews were allowed, (or even advised) and would
have set a higher speed before entering the go-around.
With the laser sensor a significant (p<0.025) increase
in mean stall margin occurred for the STD-FD mode
when compared to the MOD-FD mode.
Comparison of pitch angles
Fig.7 presents the overall result for the actual pitch
angle. It is shown in the middle box that there was a
significant overall effect of the pitch steering mode
on all pitch parameters (i.e. on maximum, mean and
minimum angle). Going from the unassisted, manual
WTA (NO-FD) to the FD-assisted WTA (MOD-FD)
when having the reactive sensor, the mean and
maximum pitch angle increased significantly by
several degrees. When having a laser on board, the
STD-FD mode led to significantly lower max and
mean pitch angles than with the MOD-FD mode.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the difference
between the maximum and minimum pitch angle is
the smallest for the NO-FD situation (e.g. about 10
degrees).
In comparing NO-FD presence with the FD-assisted
flight, also the standard deviation (std) for the pitch
angle was evaluated against the root means square
(rms) of the FD pitch angle. As Fig.8 shows, the
overall pitch steering mode available was statistically
significant on the pitch angle std (p<0.0200), but not
on the FD pitch rms! Therefore control with the FD
was almost equally easy (or difficult) for both modes.
Observe that the std in pitch for the NO-FD case has
the lowest value of all  three std values presented.
Finally, although not shown in a figure, there was a
statistically significant interaction effect between the
pitch steering mode and the experimental speed
increment parameter. Without such an increment
there was hardly an effect of FD mode, but with the
speed increment applied, there was a significant
increase in FD rms from about 2.5 to 4.1 when going
from the MOD to the STD mode.
Comparison of flight safety risk
The flight safety risk model9,9,18 set up for the go-
around segment was used for analysis. As can be
observed from Fig.9, the effect of adding FD-
assistance had no statistically significant effect in
case of the reactive sensor. Also in case of a laser
sensor, there was no meaningful difference in flight
safety between the MOD or STD type of FD.
Comparison of subjective pilot workload
The workload rating was given for the entire flight,
and it may therefore not relate to a particular flight
segment or FD-mode. Still when doing so, Fig.10
presents the result. From other studies performed in
the past15,16 it was learned that a flight director
generally decreases workload and improves the
accuracy of control when tracking the ILS. However,
for the go-around or windshear escape, the effect of
adding a FD turned out not to be statistically
significant on the PF’s workload. In case of the
reactive sensor, the trend even suggests a lower
workload without FD assistance. For the laser sensor
the differences between both FD-modes were nearly
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significant and suggest a lower workload for the STD
FD mode than for the MOD-FD mode.
Some pilot comments
During the debriefing pilots stated that the transient
behavior, i.e. the dynamics while reverting from the
glide slope tracking to the actual go-around mode,
was not damped well enough and still too sudden.
Furthermore, they disliked the behavior of both types
of go-around modes of the FD evaluated, irrespective
of the presence of a windshear and in fact in
contradiction with the questionnaires filled out. They
stated they could do better without.
Related to the STD mode they criticized it gave too
little acceleration when having full power applied.
Furthermore it should contain a more advanced
windshear guidance logic. Related to the fixed pitch
(MOD) mode, they found it difficult to fly. General
damping was found too low and could easily lead to
some kind of over-control. The stall protection
mechanism, however was appreciated.
Moreover, most revealing was the statement that they
tended to see and fly-through the FD needles instead
of accurately following them. This explains
somewhat why the pitch angles of Fig.7 deviate from
the WTA-recommended, or FD-commanded 12
degrees.
In some situations the pitch needle interaction with
the PLI symbol was found incorrect. Sometimes after
the stick shaker had been activated the pitch bar gave
an undesired momentary indication above the PLI.
This problem, although serious enough, was most
likely caused by the low-pass filtering in the PLI
signal and did not specifically relate to the FD itself.
Finally, it was stated that more advanced windshear
escape logic was already available and should be
evaluated.
The second sub-experiment
The second sub-experiment evaluated the concept of
presenting wind shear icons on the EFIS/NAV display,
see Fig.11. The circular, colored icons would indicate
the position and threat to the aircraft. Icon colors
depended on the laser-derived along beam averaged F-
factor (Fav) value. A red color would indicate a Fav [–
.21 and a shear cell within alert zone A of Fig.12. An
also circular shaped, but combined amber/red colored
icon would indicate that a similar hazardous Fav-value
exisited, but that the shear was detected somewhere in
alert zone B but still outside alert zone A. Furthermore
amber and blue icon colors could appear, indicating
lower hazard levels (viz. -.21 [ Fav > -0.10 and -.1 [
Fav > –.04).
Two different forms of displaying windshear icons
were investigated, viz. with and without speed
feedback. Speed feedback means that the above
indicated alert thresholds were modulated (increased
in absolute sense) in case the pilot increased his AT
speed after a windshear alert had occurred. This
increase would be based on a blue and flashing speed
advisory symbol on the speed tape of the PFD (See
Fig.1) which would indicate a maximum additive of
20 kts to be set. If icon colors would modify (thereby
indicating a lesser windshear hazard) after this
advised AT-speed was set, this would give additional
information to the crew about the possibility to
overcome the shear with the speed increment applied.
If the icon colors would not change then this would
be an indication of a severe shear that should be
avoided.
Results of the second sub-experiment
From all the data analyzed only the results related to
derived Flight Safety Risk, the crew workload and
the pilot display preference will be addressed.
Results related to the derived Flight Safety Risk
Fig.13 clearly shows a significant (p<.0867)
improvement in the derived flight safety risk when
having a windshear icon display. Adding a display
reduces the flight safety risk. No significant
difference was found between the two types of icon
displays.
Results related to crew workload
Crew workload was considered (by combining the
individual workload ratings given) since generally the
PNF observed the NAV-display and the PF con-
centrated on flying the aircraft. The various display
options had no significant main effect on crew
workload. However, see Fig.14, there was a highly
significant (p<0000) interaction effect with the
weather scenario flown, whether or not the speed
feedback mechanism was applied and whether an
icon display was present. For the ‘benign’ weather
cases the workload significantly reduced with the
normal display (no speed feedback). Also for the
‘worst case‘ weather scenario the workload
significantly increased without speed feedback.
Display preference of the pilots
During and after the experiment the pilots were asked
about there preference for a particular type of the
windshear icon display. Although analysis of the run-
by-run questionnaire results showed a slight pre-
ference for the icon display with the speed feedback
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concept, the pilot debriefing questionnaire results
given in Fig.15, when relatively ranked according to
the Saaty method17, showed the opposite. Together
with the pilot comments made, see below, the icon
display without the speed feedback mechanism was
regarded the best option and clearly better than having
no display.
Type of go-around made based on laser alerts
With a forward-looking windshear sensor the need  for
a windshear type of go-around, e.g. the WTA
procedure, seems questionable. Therefore, if the crew
decided to initiate a missed approach based on a
WINDSHEAR AHEAD alert, it was left to them, as
briefed, to decide to either apply the WTA or the
normal (i.e. STD) go-around procedure. Fig.16 shows
the collected results as a function of display type. As
can be observed without a display there was an
almost equal percentage of WTA and STD types of
go-around made. Some crews motivated this by stating
that they applied the rule “any windshear alert is
WTA” since they did not know where the shear was
exactly. However, when having a windshear icon
display present this situation changed significantly
and, as expected, the STD type of go-around was
favored in 80% of the cases. This was motivated by
that there was enough time to clean up the aircraft
configuration and that it was better to climb away as
soon as possible. However, a few crews were strongly
opposed to not using the WTA procedure in case of a
windshear alert.
Some pilot comments
The concept of presenting on the EFIS/NAV display
one or more windshear icons, derived from a laser
sensor, was found operationally feasible by all pilots.
Still, it was advised to integrate such icons with a
weather radar display. The icons definitely increased
situational awareness compared to having aural alerts
only. However, there was the danger of assuming that
the icons presented all the existing windshear threat,
i.e. that there would not be a windshear effect outside
of these icon areas. Using this seemingly perfect
information for close circumnavigation around icons
could lead to unpleasant surprises in real life.
Therefore the icon-indicated threats are required to be
highly representative of the actual threats present.
Stability of the icon size and colors presented were
also criticized, but this should be regarded a filtering
problem. The threat-level based aural alerting con-
cept was supported by all crews. However, with
respect to the alerts presented, it was found that the
blue labels and blue icons (i.e. lowest hazard level)
should be left out to reduce the number of cockpit
voice alerts.
The speed advisory (symbol) on the EFIS/PFD tape
was not unanimously liked by all crews. Some were
against it and some preferred a suppression below
500 ft AGL. The first level i.e. to increase speed with
5 kts was not found so useful, as crews would do it
themselves already. Surprisingly 50% of the crews
were not against automation of the strategy to
increase the aircraft speed based on a forward
looking windshear alert. Speed increases based on
reactive system alerts was disliked by most crews.
As stated before, most crews disliked the tendency of
the display with the speed feedback (i.e. with alert
threshold modulation) as it drove them further into the
shear. It was preferred to go-around earlier for such a
once-in-a-life time experience.
Crashes
Unexpectedly, 7 measurement runs, out of a total of
252 measurement runs (excluding familiarizations)
performed, resulted in a unsuccessful ending.
Before getting into details, it is remarked that all
crews were strongly recommended during the crew
briefing to apply normal safety standards, and not to
pursue flight through windshear “because it is only a
simulator experiment”, if they would not also do this
in real life. Crews were informed that some very
severe and dangerous windshears could be present,
especially in the situations with a forward-looking
detector and windshear icons present. Furthermore,
there was no intention to let crews crash. The shear
cases were expected to be recoverable for the
situations where there was no windshear icon
presentation in the cockpit. However, the other cases
(i.e. with windshear icons present) were set up such
that any flight through a red icon, representing a very
heavy, e.g. potential “killer” shear, could result in a
crash.
Crews were thoroughly briefed on this issue and the
reasoning behind it was that a realistic threat impact
and threat environment was created, such that their
understanding of and reaction to the situation would
be comparable with for instance the threat generated
by severe weather radar indications (which some-
times also show red colored areas).
Therefore, it was not really expected that these
accidents would occur. To learn from what happened
this section will highlight two of them.
Crash case statistics
One of the seven crash cases was excluded from
results afterwards, as it was found that the RFS
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Operator had intervened with a crew’s windshear
recovery too early to correctly determine the
successfulness of their action. Thus six valid crashes
remained, implying an overall average of about 2.4%.
In the first sub-experiment, one crash occurred,
giving a “non-success rate” of 1.8 % (if based on the
total of 57 go-arounds made for this part). The other
5 valid crashes happened in the second sub-
experiment. Four of them were the outcome of a
missed approach (or windshear recovery) and one of
a very heavy landing. The second sub-experiment
consisted of a total of 180 measurement runs of
which 58 were landings and 122 missed approaches.
Based on the latter, the five crashes resulted in
“unsuccessful landing and go-around rates” of 1.7 %
and 3.3 % respectively. These numbers can not be
directly compared to normal operational practice, or
safety standards, as all runs contained windshear(s)
and therefore introduced a biased domain.
Crashes distributed over crews
Apart form the second and fifth crew who never
crashed, the fourth and sixth crew crashed once and
the first and third crew even twice.
Crashes distributed over windshear display presence
Four out of the six crashes occurred without
windshear displayed in the cockpit and two with an
icon display. In the latter case, although instructed
not to do so, the crews challenged the windshear in
the amber/red icons. After this crash they never went
into it again. This clearly indicates the need for pilot
training but also the benefit of having a display.
The two crashes described next in more detail relate
to the situation with and without a FD assistance
during the windshear recovery. In both cases no
windshear icon display was present.
First crash
The first crash occurred with a repeated run of the
third crew. The evaluation would consist of a missed
approach without having a FD-assistance, i.e. a
windshear recovery of the NO-FD type would be
made and the crews were briefed about it. No
forward-looking, but only a reactive windshear
detection system was on board the aircraft, to force
the crew to fly into, or though the shear. Go-around
altitude was set at 2500 ft (762 m) AGL.
Fig.17 shows the height-to-distance relation along the
ILS descent, for all six crews. It is remarked that the
run of crew 3 contained a different and more severe
windshear than the other crews encountered, because
the wind case used the first time did not trigger a
windshear alert in their situation, and also did not
make them decide to perform a WTA type of go-
around, the objective of the investigation. As can be
observed from the figure, apart from the third crew
all other crews performed a go-around and a safe
escape. In Fig.18, it can be seen in more detail that at
the moment the third crew triggered the TOGA
thrust, they had already initiated the go-around by
applying a pitch up and were ascending. Also it can
be learned that they initiated the go-around no later
(i.e. at a lower height) than most of the other crews.
Fig.19 shows the in-situ averaged F-factor per crew.
As can be observed, crews 2 and 3 initiated the go-
around in a positive energy situation (i.e. positive F-
value), while the other crews prolonged the approach
until a windshear alert, i.e. an alert due to a negative
impact of shear on aircraft’s energy state, went off.
Fig.20 shows the windshear patterns encountered by
all crews. Note that crew 2 recovered from a more
severe downdraft then the unlucky crew 3.
Fig.21 presents the pitch angles and stall margins
(alpha-max minus AOA) of both crews 2 and 3. Crew
2 was taken for comparison reasons as an almost
similar flight path was followed.
Fig.22 shows the airspeed and Fig.23 the vertical
speed of crews 2 and 3. Note that around 4500 m
before TDP the major differences start to develop.
Case analysis
The stall margin of crew 2 and 3 was fairly similar
during the recovery along the first part of the shear. It
decreased while flying from around –4500 m to         –
3500 m Touch Down Point, but recovered after that
again for crew 2, but not for crew 3.
After TOGA Selection, crew 3 initially tried to steer
to and maintain 12 degrees of pitch angle. Then due
to the downdraft the stall margin sharply decreased,
observed by the pilots as the PLI on the PFD came
down. The Pilot Flying (PF) initially tried to follow
this PLI, but then focused on his negative climb speed
and pulled pitch to stop the aircraft from descending.
From Fig.23 it can be observed that this strategy
seemed to succeed first, although angle of attack
margin remained low. Note that the PF was flying
with a pitch ABOVE the PLI during this portion of
the recovery i.e. in the stick shaker! Suddenly the
second shear (downdraft) hit the aircraft.The angle of
attack margin decreased further. The moment the
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stick shaker was activated, the PF pushed hard to
reduce pitch back to about 10 degrees, but increased
pitch again as he noticed that the aircraft was
descending fast with about 2500 feet/ min. Being in
the stick shaker constantly, now the PF reduced pitch
sharply, close to 3 degrees. Although              noticing
the aircraft was stalling he pulled again to stop the
sink rate, pushed pitch back to about 1.5 deg and
finally in a last effort pulled pitch again.
At about 40 m AGL, the simulation was stopped
(intervened manually) by the RFS Operator on
command of the experiment leader although software
protection mechanisms were available to stop and
protect the TV-camera from impacting the ground
(i.e. the model board). The windshear recovery was
declared unsuccessful (i.e. a crash), because the
aircraft’s vertical speed of about 4000 feet/min was
found unacceptably high, and the remaining altitude
of 40 m was considered inadequate to be able to
recover from the stall.
Case conclusion
Although it could not be proven, the outcome would
most likely have been more successful, if the crew
would have adhered to the recommended target pitch
of 12 degrees as long as possible (like crew 2 did),
because a non-recoverable situation was initiated the
moment a larger pitch was pulled.
Furthermore, the PF seemed not able to perform
precise pitch control during a windshear recovery as
a result of the rapidly changing conditions and high
workload in monitoring speed, height and climb rate.
However, also a lack of confidence in the WTA-
recommended fixed pitch (NO-FD) strategy played a
role. Only with proper pilot training such confidence
can be built up.
Second crash
The second crash occurred also in a run when no
windshear information was visually presented to the
crew. However, the aircraft was equipped with an
onboard scanning laser, apart from the reactive
system. For the go-around, the FD-MOD mode was
present.
Fig.24 presents the height-to-distance during the
approach and go-around. The fifth crew made a very
early go-around high on the approach and has been
left out of the detail Figure 25. There the black dots
indicate the aircraft (crew) positions at the moment of
TOGA selection. Note that the sixth crew initiated the
go-around the latest and at the lowest position below
the glide slope.
Fig.26 shows the in-situ averaged F-factor of all
crews. As indicated, apart from crew 5, they all
encountered almost the same, very heavy windshear
severity irrespective of their flight path differences.
Therefore Fig. 27 only presents the windshear pattern
encountered by crew 6.
Fig.28 shows the actual pitch angle, the FD-comman-
ded pitch angle, the protected angle of attack value
and the AOA margin to stall.
Finally, Fig.29 indicates the aircraft velocities and
vertical speed experienced by crew six only.
Case analysis
The first observation is that an earlier go-around not
necessarily guarantees a better i.e. safer ground
clearance, see trajectories of crew 2 and crew 3.
Crew 3 initiated the go-around about 2 seconds after
a WINDSHEAR AHEAD WARNING alert was
given. The crew was already alerted for windshear
earlier on the approach by the scanning laser, because
advisory (blue label on PFD plus voice ) and caution
(amber label on PFD plus voice) alerts had preceded
the warning. The crews applied the AT-speed
increments as indicated by the flashing speed
advisory symbol on the PFD. Before this particular
evaluation run the crew was again informed that the
speed feedback (i.e. the alert threshold modulation)
would be applied even though they had no windshear
icon display. Knowing this, they should have been
more cautions. After the warning alert came in there
was clearly some cockpit confusion about which type
of go-around to perform as the PF did not made a go-
around call at all, but only shouted “yes”. Flaps and
gear were retracted.
Although the PF immediately pitched up after his
“yes”, the commanded pitch, see Fig.28, remained the
opposite, because the FD system was still in the
ILS/GS tracking mode as the crew had not yet
selected TOGA thrust. After this selection was made,
the FD commanded a fixed pitch of about 17.5
degrees instead of 12, because the flaps had been
raised to 20 degrees due to the cockpit confusion as
well. The audio track learned that the large peak of
about 23 degrees actual pitch was the result of trying
to stop the aircraft from sinking too fast.The large
pitch down command of the FD that followed is the
result of the reducing speed and rapidly increasing
angle of attack due to the shear, such that the angle of
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attack (AOA) exceeded its protection limit. Although
initially the PF closely followed the FD pitch down
command he biased it on the positive side, as if he
hesitated to fly a negative pitch. The large deviation
indicates a lack of confidence in the FD-logic.
Although the aircraft was only momentarily in the stall
and airspeed and climb speed improved again, there
was just not sufficient height available to recover form
the very strong shear. At about 19 m AGL the aircraft
still had a 3170 ft/min descent rate and the simulation
was stopped.
Case conclusion
The crew encountered a very severe, probably non-
survivable shear pattern. However, despite the alerts
presented they waited the longest of all crews to
decide to go around. From time recordings it was
found that they actually had an amber, i.e. caution
WINDSHEAR AHEAD label presented on the PFD
all the time until it changed into a red i.e. warning
label. Most probably the crew did not really
understand the meaning of the alerts and the concept
of speed feedback evaluated during that run. But the
crash supports the observation that modulation of
alert thresholds may be dangerous for crew decision
making. Finally, whether the lack of procedural
correctness, lack of confidence in the FD-mode, bad
crew coordination and not changing the aircraft
configuration would have prevented a negative
outcome can only be speculated.
General conclusions
In view of the results obtained, lacking the element of
surprise, and within all other (e.g. model) limitations
of the experiment the following conclusions were
made.
By weighting the element of flight safety risk
improvement higher than the reduction in stall
margin, having a fixed pitch flight director (FD)
assistance during a windshear recovery was found
slightly better than having no FD assistance at all.
With regard to the two different FD-modes evaluated
no meaningful difference in pilot workload or flight
safety could be observed, still they both need to be
rejected based solely on negative pilot opinions. A
more advanced logic should be designed instead.
Related to the crash cases analyzed it is concluded
that the pilot’s confidence in the WTA recommended
or FD-assisted pitch control during a windshear
recovery was decreasing under stressing and life-
threatening situations and therefore should be better
trained.
The concept of presenting windshear icons on the
EFIS/NAV-display was found operationally feasible.
It increased the crew’s situational awareness and
safety of flight. Two different icon concepts were
tested, viz. the one with and the one without having
the speed feedback mechanism. Based on pilot’s
preference, workload and flight safety considerations,
the one without speed feedback is considered the best
option. The best type of go-around procedure (viz.
WTA or standard) to apply in case of a forward look
windshear alert remains inconclusive. Finally,
integration of the icons with a weather radar display
should be considered.
Final remarks
Based on the conclusions of the 1994 experiment it
was proposed to have a more advanced, or “better”
FD logic in NLR’s pre-planned 1996 experiment
related to a weather Doppler windshear radar system.
Although the lessons learned with that ‘new’ FD
would not be part of it, some currently established
results of the 1996 experiment, which also was not
free of crashes, will be presented in September18.
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Fig. 1 EFIS/PFD showing windshear labels, the Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI) and the speed advisory.








V_reg = Vsel if  Vmin =< Vsel =< Vmax
V_reg = Vmax if Vsel> Vmax



























































































Ax_ref = V_reg * [  Vtas(t)/Vc(t) - Vtas(t-dt)/Vc(t-dt) ]*(1/dt)
Theta_Flapbias from prestored table







































































Theta-GA depends on flapsetting
Theta-ref depends on (non-TOGA) FD mode alive
Protection-AOA=AOA_stickshaker minus 1 deg
Fig. 3 Flight director MODified (fixed) pitch mode with angle of attack protection.
Sub-Experiment 1
Mod. FD better? Kruskal-Wallis test: H(1, N=48) = 1.011 p =.3147














N O M A Y  B E Y E S
 FD TYPE: MOD
N O M A Y  B E Y E S
A I A A 9 8 0 1 . s t g   
Fig. 4 Distribution of pilot satisfaction with the FD go-around mode.
Sub -Expe r imen t  1
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aiaa9803.s tg  
F(1,4) p- level  
Max . 1 .4277 .2981
M e a n 7 .9477 .0479
Min. . 00022 .9888
Laser   sensor
Reactive   sensor
F(1,5) p- level  
Max . 1 .900 .2266
M e a n 10 .00 .0250
Min. . 4909 .5148
With  speed incr .
































NO-FD (WTA) MOD-FD STD-FD 
F(2 ,8 ) p- level  
M a x . 5 . 1 3 3 . 0 3 6 8
M e a n 9 . 2 1 2 . 0 0 8 4
M i n . 1 0 . 1 3 . 0 0 6 4
a iaa08.s tg   
With  speed incr .
F(1 ,4 ) p- level
M a x . 7 . 0 9 2 . 0 5 6 2
M e a n 5 . 4 5 3 . 0 7 9 8
M i n . . 0 7 5 8 . 7 9 6 8
F(1 ,5 ) p- level  
M a x . 3 6 . 6 6 . 0 0 1 7 7
M e a n 2 7 . 1 3 . 0 0 3 4 4
M i n . 3 . 0 5 5 . 1 4 0 9 1
Laser
 sensorReactive  sensor













































NO-FD (WTA) MOD-FD STD-FD
a iaa09.s tg  
With  speed incr .
F(1 ,4 ) p- level  
Pi tch  s td .dev .
 3 .503       . 1346
FD p i t ch  rms
    -            -
F (2 ,8 ) p- level
p i tch  s td .dev . 6 . 6 4 . 0 2 0 0
FD p i t ch  rms 1 . 6 3 . 2 5 5 1
 F(1 ,5 ) p- level  
Pi tch  s td .dev . . 7 6 6 1 . 4 2 1 5
FD p i t ch  rms . 0 2 0 2 . 8 9 2 4
Reactive
 sensor Laser  sensor
Fig. 8 Effect of pitch steering (FD-mode) on the pitch angle standard deviation and the FD rms.
Sub-Experiment 1; Go-around; No Speed Incr.; Extreme MBs
  
  



























NO-FD (WTA)  MOD-FD STD-FD
a iaa9804 .s tg  
F(1,4) p- level
.62 .4744 F(1,5) p- level  
.446 .534
Reac t i ve  sensor Laser  sensor
Wi th  Speed Incr .
Fig. 9 Effect of pitch steering on flight safety risk in the go-around segment.
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Sub-Experiment 1; Without speed incr.; Extreme MB
  

















NO-FD (WTA) MOD-FD STD-FD
a iaa9807 .s tg  
F(1,3)     p- level  
4 . 0 1 5 . 1 3 9
F(1 ,4 ) p- level  
2 . 8 0 2 . 1 6 9 5
With  speed incr .
Reac t i ve  sensor Laser  sensor
Fig. 10 Effect of pitch steering/FD mode on pilot workload.
















Fig. 12 Hazard zone A and B (relative to aircraft’s longitudinal axis)
 and a red and an amber/red colored windshear icon.
Sub-Experiment 2; ANOVA
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Sub-Experiment 2; ANOVA "Dry" runs
3-way interaction: F(3,37)=14.69; p<.0000
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Friedman ANOVA : Chi Sqr. (N=12, df=2) = 18.0 p < .00012



























NONE Type A Type B
aiaasty1.s tg
Fig. 15 Relative ranking of display preference according to Saaty17.
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Sub-Experiment 2; laser aural alerts only
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Run 6, Al l  Crews
Crew  #3 had a di f ferent wind prof i le





































Details of run 6, All Crews
Crew #3 had a d i f ferent  wind prof i le
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Run 6,  All crews
Crew #3  had  a  d i f fe ren t  w ind  p ro f i l e
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Wind patterns,  All crews, run 6 
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 crew #2 : 4108 ft/min 
(crew #3 : 4007 ft/min)
a iaa62a .s tg
crew #3
Fig. 20 Wind speeds encountered along the trajectory for all crews.
Run 6, Crews #2 and #3

































Fig. 21 Pitch angle and angle of attack time histories along the trajectory for crews 2 and 3.
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Run 6, Crews #2 and #3




















Fig. 22 True airspeed along the trajectory for crews 2 and 3.
Run 6, Crews #2 and #3

























Fig. 23 Vertical speed along the trajectory for crews 2 and 3.
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Run 24, All crews



























Fig. 24 Height versus distance path for all crews.
Run 24, Crews #1 - #4 and #5

























   TOGA selection
Fig. 25 Detail of height versus path along the ILS glide slope (crew 5 left out).
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Run 24, All crews
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   TOGA selection
Fig. 26 Reactive system averaged F-factor during run 24 for all crews.
Run 24, Crew #6



































Fig. 27 Wind speeds versus distance for crew 6 on run 24.
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Run number 24, Crew #6





























Pro tec t i on  mode
Act iva ted
stall
Fig. 28 Pitch angle, FD-commanded pitch, AOA and stall margin for crew 6 on run 24.
Run 24, Crew #6
























































Fig. 29 Velocities experienced during run 24 with crew 6.
